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Barriers to Justice, Limits to Deterrence: Tort Law
Theory and State Approaches to Shielding School
Districts and Their Employees from Liability for
Negligent Supervision
Phillip Buckley*
Despite its importance, the law of tort and negligence in the context of
American public schools is poorly understood and relatively
understudied. Through the lens of tort law theory, this Article examines
the various legal frameworks that govern the tort of negligent supervision
in four states: Arkansas, Illinois, Colorado, and Maine. In these four
states, various statutes serve to shield public school districts and their
employees from liability for harms experienced by students under their
supervision. This Article argues that the frameworks in these states
fundamentally undermine the two primary purposes of tort law:
corrective justice and deterrence. This Article then draws on tort law
theory to provide suggestions for how legislators could revise the law in
these states to strike a better balance between the goals of tort law and
the public policy justifications for limiting the liability of districts and
employees.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most complicated areas of education law is the law of tort,
particularly as it relates to school liability for negligence. This area of
law is a complex product of centuries-old common law doctrines,
statutory and judicial reforms of those doctrines, and an exhaustive body
of case law in which those doctrines and related statutes have been
applied by judges. Perhaps because of this complexity, the authors of
education law textbooks have mischaracterized and underemphasized the
issue of negligence as it applies to public schools.1 Unsurprisingly,
research shows that educators are poorly informed on the topic.2 Despite
the lack of awareness, negligence in the public school context is an
important legal issue for parents, guardians, and children concerned about
safety in schools and the ability to recover damages for injuries resulting
from negligence. It is also important that districts, administrators, and
teachers that may be vulnerable to legal claims based on negligence
understand the implications of the law.
Although important, public school negligence remains relatively
understudied. In 2008, Perry Zirkel and John Clark asserted that “school
negligence is a staple [of education law] that merits more careful and
complete study and training, tempered by the need for objective and

1. Peter J. Maher et al., Governmental and Official Immunity for School Districts and Their
Employees: Alive and Well, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 234, 235 (2010).
2. See Todd A. DeMitchell & Thomas Carroll, A Duty Owed: Tort Liability and the Perceptions
of Public School Principals, 201 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 19 (2005) (explaining that despite the importance
of tort liability in education law, few principals spend considerable time examining the topic);
Suzanne E. Eckes et al., Trends in Court Opinions Involving Negligence in K–12 Schools:
Considerations for Teachers and Administrators, 275 EDUC. L. REP. 505, 505–06 (2012)
(discussing that the purpose of the article is to attempt to provide practical guidance to teachers in
the context of negligence in the school setting).
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specific knowledge customized to the particular state jurisdiction and
school situation.”3 Although scholars have begun to respond to the need
for more research regarding school negligence,4 the literature remains
underdeveloped given the complexity and importance of this area of law.
This Article specifically focuses on district and employee liability for
harm resulting from the negligent supervision of students. One premise
of this Article is that understanding the legal landscape related to district
and district-employee liability for negligence requires a comprehensive
state-by-state approach that considers: (1) how statutory and common law
define and apply the traditional elements of negligence, including duty
and foreseeability, in the context of public schools; (2) how statutory and
common law treat relevant immunity doctrines, particularly sovereign
immunity and discretionary immunity; and (3) other relevant aspects of
statutory law including damage limits and caps, heightened standards of
evidentiary proof, and indemnification. This Article presents the results
of a comprehensive analysis of the law of four states and examines the
frameworks of those states from the perspective of tort law theory.
Part I of this Article discusses the two primary goals of tort law as
understood by tort law theory: corrective justice and deterrence. Part II
presents the legal frameworks that govern public school liability for
negligent supervision in four states that represent four different regions
of the United States: Arkansas, Illinois, Colorado, and Maine. These four
states were chosen because they each take different approaches to limit
the liability of states, school districts, and district employees by applying:
sovereign immunity; discretionary immunity; less demanding standards
of care for districts and their employees; more demanding evidentiary
standards; potential liability for defendant legal fees; and damage caps.
In the end, these four states’ legal frameworks lead to the same legal
result: districts, administrators, and teachers are practically shielded from
all or nearly all liability for harms that result from the negligent
supervision of students.5
3. Perry A. Zirkel & John H. Clark, School Negligence Case Law Trends, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 345,
363 (2008).
4. See, e.g., Eckes et al., supra note 2, at 505–06 (explaining that the purpose of the article is to
address teachers’ concerns regarding negligence in schools); Diane Holben & Perry A. Zirkel,
Empirical Trends in Teacher Tort Liability for Student Fights, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 151, 152 (2011)
(attempting to explain the limitations on teachers’ actions due to litigation); Maher et al., supra
note 1, at 238 (synthesizing statutory law relating to governmental immunity as it applies to
schools).
5. In some cases involving improper supervision, the plaintiffs may be able to establish liability
via section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871. But this path, which rests on the assertion
that the district or employee involved violated the student’s liberty rights under substantive due
process, has its own limitations including qualified immunity for individuals, a lack of a liability
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Part III of this Article examines the implications of these four
frameworks from the perspective of tort law theory. This Article
demonstrates how the frameworks of these states conflict with the goals
of tort law, as understood by tort law theory, and undermine the goals of
corrective justice and deterrence. Moreover, these frameworks thwart the
intentions of judges and legislators who dismantled the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity that once shielded districts,
administrators, and teachers from liability for negligent supervision. In
the end, while only Arkansas retains sovereign immunity in its previous,
common law form, the law in all four states represents a legal reality
where students injured because of district or employee negligence find
themselves in the same situation they were in before the rejection of
sovereign immunity: they lack a meaningful remedy for their injuries.
This Article concludes with a brief discussion of how tort reform could
address this shortcoming.
I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND DETERRENCE: THE THEORETICAL BASES FOR
THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE
As legal scholar Ernest Weinrib stated: “Tort theory attempts to
formulate a general conception of the justifications that underlie the
norms of tort law.”6 Although tort law scholarship has been rife with
debate about which theoretical conception of tort law best captures the
goals and purposes of tort law that scholarship generally coalesces into
two perspectives: the corrective justice perspective and the deterrence
perspective.7 The corrective justice perspective “focuses on correcting
the wrong a particular tortfeasor committed against a particular victim.”8
And the method of correcting the wrong—the “remedy”—takes a
particular form: the return of both parties to the status quo ante. This
remedy, thus, correlates with, or is connected to, the wrong by placing
the parties back to their positions before the wrong occurred. In
Weinrib’s words, “the remedy responds to the injustice [done by the
defendant and suffered by the plaintiff] and endeavours, so far as
for failing to protect students from the actions of third parties, and a lack of vicarious liability. For
a discussion of the hurdles facing plaintiffs who rely on § 1983, see Karen M. Blum, Section 1983
Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913 (2015).
6. Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626 (2002).
7. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) (noting the “two major camps of tort scholars”);
Weinrib, supra note 6, at 622 (highlighting the gap between the two approaches to contemporary
tort law).
8. Benjamin Shmueli, Legal Pluralism in Tort Law Theory: Balancing Instrumental Theories
and Corrective Justice, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 745, 751 (2015).

10_BUCKLEY (1015-39).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Barriers to Justice, Limits to Deterrence

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

1019

possible, to undo it.”9 Undoing the injustice must involve both parties
because the injustice encompasses the experience of two parties—the
party who has committed the injustice and the party who has suffered
from it. Under the guise of corrective justice, undoing that injustice calls
for a remedy that impacts or involves both parties. Thus, the remedy must
accomplish two things: in flowing to the plaintiff, it must “make the
plaintiff whole,” and in flowing from the defendant, it must exact a price
roughly equal to the suffering experienced by the plaintiff due to the
injustice committed by the defendant.10
From the second theoretical perspective, that of deterrence, tort law
serves as a tool for pursuing a particular social end: influencing behavior
in ways that reduce the chances that members of society will be harmed.
In this way, the deterrence perspective views tort law more through an
instrumentalist lens, with an eye toward preventing harm, as opposed to
the moral and fairness-infused perspective of corrective justice. The
desire to deter people from committing certain behaviors is reflected in
several aspects of tort law. For example, the fact that monetary awards
flow from the person who committed the harm reflects this deterrent goal:
if courts did not hold tortfeasors liable for the damages they caused, there
would be no deterrent effect. Punitive damages provide another example.
With punitive damages, plaintiffs are awarded additional damages,
damages that go beyond those to which they are otherwise entitled.
Punitive damages do not reflect the goal of corrective justice—returning
the parties to the status quo ante—for the award of punitive damages is
beyond what is required to attain that goal. Rather, punitive damages
serve as an additional incentive for the avoidance of risky behaviors.
This Article, similar to other tort law scholarship,11 adopts a pluralistic
understanding of the justifications of tort law. From a jurisprudential
perspective, this pluralistic approach reflects the goals and purposes of
tort law, including negligence, as understood by lawyers and judges.
Particular principles related to negligence reflect the idea that tort law
encompasses both normative and instrumentalist functions.
Foreseeability represents one such principle. While the perspective of
9. Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 350 (2002).
10. Corrective justice is thwarted if the plaintiff is not compensated. Partly for this reason, if
the defendant is unable to pay, principles of vicarious liability apply to hold other parties liable
under particular circumstances. A harder question is raised by insurance: if having an insurance
company pay leads to an avoidance of the harm on the part of the tortfeasor, corrective justice is
undermined. But insurance is often the only way a plaintiff will recover large damage awards and
insurance serves other social goals. In addition, the defendants may experience other penalties
when found liable for negligence: higher insurance rates, the payment of deductibles, public
relations issues, and possible job security implications.
11. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1801; Shmueli, supra note 8, at 749.
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corrective justice supports awarding damages to plaintiffs harmed by the
conduct of others, those same principles also support restricting the award
of damages in cases where the negligent party is less morally culpable for
the harms. Under negligence law, a negligent actor is not responsible for
all harms caused by his or her wrongdoing; the actor is responsible for
only those harms that are foreseeable and, thus, should have led the actor
to refrain from behaving in a less-than-careful way. An actor’s decision
to behave in a particular way is only a moral transgression when that
decision exposes another person to risks of which the actor should have
been aware. Likewise, one can understand the requirement of
foreseeability from the perspective of deterrence: if a particular result is
unforeseeable to an actor, one should not expect the actor to take actions
to prevent the result from happening. Moreover, punishing an actor for
the unforeseeable consequences of his or her conduct will not lead that
actor to refrain from such conduct because he or she is unaware that such
consequences could result.
The rules that focus on awarding punitive damages also reflect the
pluralistic perspective. Punitive damages typically are awarded only in
cases where the tortfeasor grossly deviates from the applicable standard
of care so that his or her culpability rises above the level of
unreasonableness and amounts to gross negligence or recklessness.
Because punitive damage awards surpass the amount necessary to make
the plaintiff whole, they are not called for under the guise of corrective
justice. But in cases involving more significant moral transgressions, the
normative aspects of corrective justice support more significant damage
awards that punish and, thus, deter such behavior.
II. THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND FOUR STATES’
APPROACHES TO SHIELDING DISTRICTS AND TEACHERS FROM LIABILITY
One must first understand the legal frameworks that govern negligent
supervision before examining those frameworks through the lens of tort
law theory. Doing so, however, is a mammoth task. The frameworks
encompass several complex issues, including the traditional elements of
the tort of negligence (duty, breach, causation/foreseeability, and injury),
as well as other tort law principles that present particular issues in the
context of public schools. These issues include school districts’ vicarious
liability for employee conduct and the viability of doctrines like
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk when the injured party
is a child. Principles and doctrines specifically related to state, district,
and district-employee liability—particularly the issue of immunity—
further exacerbate the complexity of these legal frameworks. All of this
is compounded by the fact that every state defines and applies the
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elements of negligence, state liability and immunity, and related doctrines
in its own way. Rather than discussing the detailed traditional elements
of, and defenses to, the tort of negligence, this Article specifically
considers how state law acts to shield public school districts and district
employees from liability for negligence in cases where private actors
would otherwise be liable.
Like the liability of other entities of state government, the liability of
public schools is governed by various state statutes and court decisions
related to tort law and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. According to
the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, the king—or
subsequently, in the United States, state and federal government—was
immune from liability. Under United States common law, courts
originally interpreted the doctrine of sovereign immunity as shielding
public school districts and teachers from tort liability. 12 For example, in
Illinois, the state supreme court explicitly applied the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to public schools in 1898 in Kinnare v. City of
Chicago.13 But beginning in the 1920s, some criticized the doctrine of
sovereign immunity for requiring injured persons “to bear almost all the
risks of a defective, negligent, perverse[,] or erroneous administration of
the State’s functions.”14 In response to such criticisms and perceived
injustices, state courts and legislatures began altering or rejecting the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court declared in 1959 that “the rule of school district tort
immunity is unjust, unsupported by any valid reason, and has no rightful
place in modern day society.”15
In response to the common law shift away from absolute sovereign
immunity, many states passed statutes that restricted state and local
governmental liability for torts, including negligence. Under most of
these laws, school districts and teachers no longer enjoyed absolute
immunity from tort liability. But the extent to which districts and
teachers could be held liable varied—and continues to vary—
considerably: some states eliminated immunity completely; others
merely weakened it.16 For example, in response to the elimination of
sovereign immunity by the Illinois Supreme Court’s 1959 decision in
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, the Illinois legislature
12. KERN ALEXANDER & DAVID M. ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 722
(Wadsworth Cengage Learning 8th ed. 2011) (1985).
13. 171 N.E. 535, 536–37 (Ill. 1898).
14. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1924).
15. Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist., 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill. 1959).
16. ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 727.
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passed the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act (“Illinois Tort Immunity Act”) and section 24-24 of the
Illinois School Code in 1965.17 These two laws acknowledged the
elimination of absolute state immunity under common law, but
nonetheless provided Illinois school districts and teachers with a
significant degree of protection against tort law liability. Many states
took a similar approach and preserved much of the immunity recognized
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, showing that, despite the
assertion by some scholars and commentators that sovereign immunity is
“moribund,” the doctrine remains “alive and well.”18
As a result of these legislative and court-mandated limitations on, and
reassertions of, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, what was once a cutand-dried nationwide rule—public schools and teachers are immune from
civil liability—was replaced by a patchwork of policies that varied from
state to state. This Article takes a closer look at the patchwork in four
states: Illinois, Colorado, Arkansas, and Maine.
A. Illinois Approach: Alter the Common Law Rules of Negligence by
Applying a More Forgiving Standard of Care
In comparison with Colorado and Arkansas, Illinois responded to the
common law abrogation of sovereign immunity in a way that provides
districts and district employees with less protection from liability for
negligent supervision. But the protection in Illinois is nonetheless still
robust. The linchpin of this protective framework is the statutory
definition of the standard of care that districts and district employees owe
to the students they are supervising. Specifically, under Illinois law,
neither a school district nor an employee is liable for injuries incurred by
a student unless the injuries are the result of “willful and wanton conduct”
on the part of the district or employee supervising that student.19 Both
judicial interpretation of the Illinois School Code and the language of
several sections of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act reflect this standard.
For cases involving the negligent supervision of public school
students, the Illinois Tort Immunity Act provides the most
straightforward language establishing the willful and wanton standard:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity
nor a public employee who undertakes to supervise an activity on or the
use of any public property is liable for an injury unless the local public
17. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (2017); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 (2017).
18. Maher et al., supra note 1, at 234.
19. Other states, including Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and West Virginia, also apply the
willful and wanton standard.
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entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct in its
supervision proximately causing such injury.20

Other sections of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act also confer immunity
absent a showing of willful and wanton conduct.21
In addition to the protections afforded to school districts and their
employees under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, courts interpret the
Illinois School Code to apply the willful and wanton standard to claims
based on negligent supervision of school students. The Illinois School
Code applies the principle of in loco parentis (“in place of a parent”) to
the relationship between educators and students.
In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and
the school children, [teachers, other certificated educational employees,
and any other person, whether or not a certificated employee, providing
a related service for or with respect to a student] stand in the relation of
parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all
activities connected with the school program, including all athletic and
extracurricular programs, and may be exercised at any time for the
safety and supervision of the pupils in the absence of their parents or
guardians.22

As interpreted by the Illinois courts, this language from the Illinois
School Code “specifically confers upon educators the status of parent or
guardian to the students and since a parent is not liable for injuries to his
child absent wilful [sic] and wanton misconduct, it therefore follows that
the same standard applies as between educator and student.”23
Thus, under both the Illinois Tort Immunity Act and the Illinois School
Code, teachers, administrators, and districts act pursuant to the standard
of care owed to students under their supervision so long as they do not
evidence a showing of willful and wanton conduct. As defined under the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act, “willful and wanton conduct” is “a course of
action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or
which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious
disregard for the safety of others.”24 Within the context of the Illinois
20. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-108(a) (2015). Section 1-206 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act
defines “local public entity” to include a “school district, school board, educational service region,
regional board of school trustees, trustees of schools of townships, treasurers of schools of
townships.” 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-206 (2015).
21. See, e.g., id. at 10/2-202 (“A public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the
execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton
conduct.”).
22. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (2015).
23. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Lawrence Hall Youth Servs., 2012 IL App (1st) 103758, ¶ 9, 966 N.E.2d
52, 58.
24. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-210 (2015) (emphasis added).
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School Code, as interpreted by Illinois courts, “[w]ilful [sic] and wanton
conduct is conduct which is either ‘intentional or done with a conscious
disregard or indifference for the consequences when the known safety of
other persons is involved.’”25
This forgiving standard of care has provided the basis for the rejection
of many negligent supervision claims in Illinois courts, including:
 Doe v. Lawrence Hall Youth Services, in which a teacher gave
drugs and alcohol to a high school student at a residential school
for at-risk youth and then engaged in sexual acts with the
student.26
 Braun v. Board of Education, in which an epileptic student
suffered a seizure and was subsequently injured when a coach
told the student to use a ladder, rather than a school-provided
scaffold, to reach the scoreboard.27
 Brooks v. McLean County Unit District No. 5, in which a junior
high school student collapsed and died after he and a group of
junior high school students played a “game” called “body shots,”
which involved voluntarily punching each other with closed fists
as hard as they could in the abdomen, chest, and ribs.28
 Repede v. Community Unit School District No. 300, in which a
freshman cheerleader, while practicing a pyramid routine, fell
and broke her arm. The plaintiff-cheerleader alleged that the
squad was insufficiently trained and that the coaches failed to
provide “spotters.”29
Although the defendants in these cases may have acted unreasonably and,
thus, would be liable for ordinary negligence, the application of the more
forgiving willful and wanton standard has led courts to reject these and
other similar sorts of claims.
B. Colorado Approach: Couple a Forgiving Duty of Care with a More
Demanding Evidentiary Standard and the Threat of Plaintiff Liability
for the Defendant’s Attorney’s Fees
In comparison with Illinois law, Colorado law presents even further
barriers to plaintiffs seeking recovery for damages resulting from
negligent supervision. Similar to Illinois, Colorado constructs those
strong barriers by relying on a patchwork of policies. Colorado follows

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Grant v. Bd. of Trs., 676 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ill. 1997).
Lawrence Hall Youth Servs., 2012 IL App (1st) 103758, ¶¶ 1–5, 966 N.E.2d at 54–55.
502 N.E.2d 1076, 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
2014 IL App (4th) 130503,¶ 1, 8 N.E.3d 1203, 1206.
779 N.E.2d 372, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
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Illinois in restricting negligent supervision liability for district employees
unless the harm resulted from willful and wanton misconduct. But unlike
Illinois, Colorado strengthens its barriers to liability by granting near
absolute immunity to school districts. Two Colorado statutes govern
negligent supervision claims against employees and districts and, in
conjunction, grant robust immunity to school districts and their
employees in negligent supervision cases: the Teacher and School
Administrator Protection Act30 and the Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act.31 First, under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act,
school districts, like all public entities, are absolutely immune from
liability except under a limited set of circumstances, most of which would
not be relevant in negligent supervision cases.32 Second, under the
Teacher and School Administrator Protection Act:
An educational entity and its employees are immune from suit for
taking an action regarding the supervision, grading, suspension,
expulsion, or discipline of a student while the student is on the property
of the educational entity or under the supervision of the educational
entity or its employees; except that immunity shall not apply if the
action is committed willfully and wantonly and violates a statute, rule,
or regulation or a clearly articulated policy of the educational entity.33

While the Teacher and School Administrator Protection Act would
appear to restrict the absolute immunity that districts enjoy under the
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, article 12 of the Teacher and
School Administrator Protection Act requires that, if a provision of that
act conflicts with a provision of the Governmental Immunity Act, “the
provision that grants the greatest immunity and protection to an
educational entity and its employees shall prevail.” 34 Thus, while the
Teacher and School Administrator Protection Act allows for recovery
against employees under the willful and wanton standard, the more
sweeping immunity for school districts found in the Governmental
Immunity Act would apply to claims made against districts.
While neither the Colorado Teacher and School Administrator
Protection Act nor the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act define the
willful and wanton standard, Colorado courts and the Colorado
30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-12 (2017).
31. Id. § 24-10.
32. “A public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or
could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by
the claimant except as provided otherwise in this section.” Id. § 24-10-106(1). The one exception
that is relevant to schools is the operation of a motor vehicle. The other exceptions pertain to things
such as the condition of public roads and the operation of a public hospital.
33. Id. § 22-12-104.
34. Id. § 22-12-102(3).
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legislature in other statutes have defined the standard. As noted in a
recent decision by the Jefferson County District Court in Colorado:
An early decision defined the term as follows: The demarcation
between ordinary negligence, and willful and wanton disregard, is that
in the latter the actor was fully aware of the danger and should have
realized its probable consequences, yet deliberately avoided all
precaution to prevent disaster. A failure to act in prevention of accident
is but simple negligence; a mentally active restraint from such action is
willful. Omitting to weigh consequences is simple negligence; refusing
to weigh them is willful.35

The Jefferson County District Court went on to note that Colorado’s
punitive damages statute defines “willful and wanton conduct” as
conduct “purposely committed which the actor must have realized as
dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to
consequences, or of the rights and safety of others.”36
In 2015, Colorado law regarding negligent supervision became further
complicated when the legislature passed the Claire Davis School Safety
Act.37 This act, passed in response to the 2013 murder of Claire Davis at
her Colorado high school, recognizes a very narrow exception to the grant
of absolute immunity to districts found in the Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act.38 At first blush, the Claire Davis School Safety Act seems
to drastically alter the standard of care applicable in negligent supervision
cases. Specifically, subsection three of the act suggests that the
reasonable care standard applies to claims made against districts and
district employees for negligent supervision, not the willful and wanton
standard that the Teacher and School Administrator Protection Act
provides.39 But much of what the act gives plaintiffs in subsection three
is retracted by other provisions of the act. First, subsection four of the
act reasserts districts’ absolute immunity for tort liability, albeit while
also recognizing the possibility of exceptions:
35. Order re: claims concerning willful and wanton conduct of individual defending parties, In
re The Lower North Fork Fire Litigation, No. 12 CV 2550, at 3 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 18, 2014)
(citing Pettingell v. Moede, 271 P.2d 1038, 1042 (Colo. 1954)).
36. See id. (referring to COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(b) (2016)).
37. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.3 (2015).
38. Tom Barry, Claire Davis School Safety Act Passes Both Houses: Governor Expected to Sign
Bill Waiving Immunity, VILLAGER (May 6, 2015), http://www.villagerpublishing.com/72321/frontpage/claire-davis-school-safety-act-passes-both-houses/.
39. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-106.3(3) (West 2015) (“All school districts and charter
schools and their employees in this state have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect all
students, faculty, and staff from harm from acts committed by another person when the harm is
reasonably foreseeable, while such students, faculty, and staff are within the school facilities or are
participating in school-sponsored activities.”).
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, a public school
district or charter school is immune from liability in all claims for injury
that lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the
type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as
otherwise provided in this section or in this article.40

Subsection four goes on to formulate the precise exception to absolute
district liability that the Claire Davis School Safety Act creates.
Specifically, absolute immunity does not apply when a breach of duty
claim arises from an incident of school violence.41 In other words, the
reasonable care standard applies in cases in which an incident of school
violence42 causes harm.43 But the reasonable care standard only applies
to claims asserting direct or vicarious liability against districts because
subsection four of the act specifically states: “[a]n employee of a public
school, school district, or a charter school is not subject to suit under this
section in his or her individual capacity unless the employee’s actions or
omissions are willful and wanton.”44
In addition to this tangled statutory web related to district and district
employee immunity, Colorado law contains two other provisions that
directly and indirectly enhance that immunity. Per the Claire Davis
School Safety Act, because these two provisions appear in article 12 of
the Colorado Teacher and School Administrator Protection Act, they do
not apply to claims “arising from an incident of school violence.”45 But
they do apply to any other claim based on negligent supervision. First,
subsection 1 of section 104 of article 12, the same provision that
establishes the willful and wanton standard to negligent supervision
claims, also establishes a heightened evidentiary standard for the
40. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-106.3(4) (West 2015).
41. Id. § 24-10-106.3.
42. Id. § 24-10-106.3(2) (an incident of school violence is defined as “an occurrence at a public
school or public school-sponsored activity in which a person: (I) Engaged in a crime of violence;
and (II) The actions described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) by that person caused serious
bodily injury or death to any other person”). Under the statute, “‘[c]rime of violence’ means that
the person committed, conspired to commit, or attempted to commit one of the following crimes:
(I) Murder; (II) First degree assault; or (III) A felony sexual assault, as defined in section 18-3-402,
C.R.S.” Id.
43. Article 12 of the Colorado Teacher and School Administrator Protection Act requires courts
to apply whichever of the two acts provides the most protection to districts. But subsection four of
the Claire Davis School Safety Act adds that, with respect to claims arising out of incidents of
school violence, “the provisions of article 12 . . . . do not apply to school districts and charter
schools.” Id. § 24-10-106.3. Thus, although the Colorado Teacher and School Administrator Act
provides more protection to districts, the Claire Davis School Safety Act nonetheless applies in
cases involving school violence.
44. Id. § 24-10-106.3(4).
45. Id.

10_BUCKLEY (1015-39).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1028

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

[Vol. 48

establishment of liability for such claims:
[I]mmunity [under the Act] shall not apply if the action is committed
willfully and wantonly and violates a statute, rule, or regulation or a
clearly articulated policy of the educational entity. The burden of
proving the violation shall rest with the plaintiff and must be established
by clear and convincing evidence to the court as part of a summary
proceeding. If at the summary proceeding the court finds a violation
exists, the educational entity and its employee may raise immunity at
trial under the provisions of this article and the “Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act.”46

In other words, before a negligent supervision claim may proceed to
trial, the plaintiff first must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the district or its employees willfully and wantonly committed a
violation of a statute, rule, regulation, or a clearly articulated district
policy. In contrast, in Colorado civil actions generally, the plaintiff
prevails upon meeting the less demanding “preponderance of the
evidence” standard.47
As if these provisions were not enough to discourage plaintiffs from
filing claims for negligent supervision, Colorado adds one more provision
that should give plaintiffs and their lawyers pause:
(1) In a civil action or proceeding against an educational entity or its
employee in which the court finds the educational entity or its employee
is immune from suit or from liability pursuant to the provisions of
section 22-12-104, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney
fees to the defendant or defendants. The court in its discretion may
determine whether such fees and costs are to be borne by the plaintiff’s
attorney, the plaintiff, or both.
(2) Expert witness fees may be included as part of the costs awarded
under this section.48

In other words, if the plaintiff loses on the basis of immunity—if, at
the end of the trial, it is determined that either the district was immune,
perhaps because the action did not arise out of an incident of school
violence, or the employee was immune, because he or she did not act
willfully and wantonly—the plaintiff and/or the plaintiff’s lawyer could
be required to pay the attorney and expert witness fees for the district
and/or the employee. Although the heading for this provision reads,
“frivolous actions—attorney fees—costs,” nothing in the actual wording
of the statute requires that the claim be “frivolous.”49 Rather, the plaintiff
simply must not prevail. This is in contravention of the traditional rule
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 22-12-104.
Id. § 13-25-127.
Id. § 22-12-106.
Id.
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under which parties to a civil action are responsible for their own
attorneys’ fees absent a determination that the action was based on a
groundless claim or designed to harass the defendant.
In addition to possibly deterring the filing of negligent supervision
claims, the protections against liability recognized under Colorado law
have provided the basis for dismissing many of the claims that are
actually filed. These cases include:
 Young v. Brighton School District 27J, in which “a minor child,
slipped and fell in a puddle of water that had accumulated on a
concrete walkway at his public elementary school.”50
 Robinson v. Ignacio School District, 11JT, in which, while riding
on the school bus, “two older students, including the bus driver’s
son . . . grabbed [a seven-year-old student’s] neck and began to
jerk his head back and forth, causing a severe cervical strain and
a concussion.”51
 Padilla v. School District No. 1, in which the mother of Padilla—
a ten-year-old developmentally disabled child who suffered from
serious medical conditions and became frightened and agitated
when restrained, pulled, or grabbed—informed personnel of the
Denver Public Schools (“DPS”) that Padilla should not be pulled
or restrained. One day, DPS employees placed Padilla in her
stroller out of sight against a door when “Padilla refused to eat
her lunch, and became agitated when DPS employees tried to get
her to eat.” When in the stroller, “Padilla became agitated, the
stroller fell backward, and Padilla struck her head against the
floor, fracturing her skull.”52
C. Arkansas Approach: Reinstate the Common Law Approach to
Sovereign Immunity
Compared to the approaches taken in Colorado and Illinois, the
approach in Arkansas is refreshingly straightforward, albeit problematic
from the perspective of corrective justice, deterrence, and the rights of
injured plaintiffs. The foundation of the Arkansas framework is the
absolute immunity granted to the State under article 5, section 20 of the
Arkansas Constitution: “The State of Arkansas shall never be made
defendant in any of her courts.”53 The principles that apply to the liability
of school districts and their employees are only slightly more
50.
51.
52.
53.

Young ex rel. C.Y. v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 325 P.3d 571, 574 (Colo. 2014).
Robinson ex rel. C.R. v. Ignacio Sch. Dist., 11JT, 328 P.3d 297, 298 (Colo. App. 2014).
Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 25 P.3d 1176, 1178 (Colo. 2001).
ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20.
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complicated. In 1968, the Arkansas Supreme Court abrogated the
extension of absolute sovereign immunity to municipalities and other
political subdivisions of the State, including school districts.54 But in
1969, the Arkansas legislature reinstated that immunity. 55 Arkansas
statutory law, specifically section 21-9-301(a) of the annotated state code,
extends tort immunity to charter schools and school districts, at least to
the extent that such schools and districts are not insured:
It is declared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all
counties, municipal corporations, school districts, public charter
schools, special improvement districts, and all other political
subdivisions of the state and any of their boards, commissions,
agencies, authorities, or other governing bodies shall be immune from
liability and from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be
covered by liability insurance.56

Section 21-9-301(b) of the same statute extends that immunity to cover
claims based on respondeat superior: “No tort action shall lie against any
such political subdivision because of the acts of its agents and
employees.”57 Another provision requires that all political subdivisions
acquire motor vehicle insurance, thus indirectly creating an exception to
the blanket immunity enjoyed by school districts.58 But that insurance
needs to only meet the minimum requirements for drivers in the state,
potentially limiting the liability under this exception to $25,000 for one
person or $50,000 for two or more persons.59
Thus, most Arkansas plaintiffs seeking restitution for harms caused by
negligent supervision must look to state employees—namely, school
teachers and administrators—for relief if the district or charter school
responsible for the harm is not insured. But even these relatively shallow
pockets are shielded under a line of court cases stretching back to 1983.
Specifically, in 1983, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the immunity
54. This decision maintained limited immunity for discretionary acts.
We would make plain that this decision imposes liability on municipalities only for the
imperfect, negligent, unskillful execution of a thing ordained to be done. No tort action
will lie against them for those acts involving judgment and discretion; which are judicial
and legislative or quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative in nature. The exercise of
discretion necessarily carries with it the right to be wrong. It is only for ordinary torts
committed in the execution of the activities decided upon that a tort action will lie; not
for the decision itself.
Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45, 53 (Ark. 1968).
55. Hardin v. City of Devalls Bluff, 508 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Ark. 1974).
56. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 21-9-301 (West 2011).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. § 27-22-104.
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created by section 21-9-301 extends to the employees of any state actor
covered by the law when such employees commit “acts of negligence in
carrying out their official duties.”60 The immunity applies when the
employee is sued in his or her official or individual capacity. As
summarized by the United States District Court for the Western Division
of Arkansas in Braden v. Mount Home School District: “Officials and
employees of governmental entities named in [section] 21-9-301 are also
immune from suit for negligence in their official capacities. School
officials are specifically immune from suit in their individual capacities,
as well.”61
These constitutional, statutory, and judicial protections against state,
district, and public employee liability have been applied in numerous
cases in which children attending Arkansas public schools have been
harmed at, or while travelling to and from, school. These cases have
included:
 Doe v. Baum, in which an eighth grader allegedly raped a female
third grader while she traveled home on the school bus.62
 Brown v. Fountain Hill School District, in which a high school
shop teacher allegedly removed the safety guard from a table saw,
leading a male student to amputate the fingers on his right hand.63
 Young v. Blytheville School District, in which a “minor male”
allegedly raped a thirteen-year-old female student inside the
men’s bathroom at her school.64
 R.P. v. Springdale School District, in which classmates allegedly
abused a seventeen-year-old special needs student, confined him
in a dog cage, forced him to eat dog feces, and sexually exposed
him to a group of other students.65
In most cases, Arkansas courts grant the defendants’ motions to
dismiss or motions for summary judgment absent a showing by the
plaintiff that districts or their employees acted with intent. 66 In other
words, for students harmed due to negligent supervision in Arkansas
60. Mathews v. Martin, 658 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Ark. 1983).
61. Braden ex rel. M. v. Mount Home Sch. Dist., 903 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738–39 (W.D. Ark.
2012) (internal citations omitted).
62. Doe v. Baum, 72 S.W.3d 476, 476 (Ark. 2002).
63. Brown v. Fountain Hill Sch. Dist., 1 S.W.3d 27, 28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999).
64. Young v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 425 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013).
65. R.P. ex rel. K.P. v. Springdale Sch. Dist., No. 06-5014, 2007 WL552117, at *1 (W.D. Ark.
Feb. 21, 2007).
66. The one bright spot in Arkansas immunity law from the perspective of plaintiffs came in
1989, when the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the immunity from liability for employees under
section 21-9-301 did not extend to intentional torts. Battle v. Harris, 766 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Ark.
1989).
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public schools, no path to recovery apparently exists under tort law,
unless a district chooses to acquire insurance against claims to which they
otherwise would be immune.
D. Maine Approach: Sovereign Immunity for Districts, Discretionary
Immunity for Employees, and Liability and Damages Caps
The law in Maine illustrates two other powerful means of limiting
district and district employee liability: discretionary immunity and
damage caps. Maine law, like the law in many other states, starts with a
blanket grant of immunity for school districts: “Except as otherwise
expressly provided by statute, all governmental entities shall be immune
from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages.” 67 The
blanket immunity exceptions that are most relevant to school districts
include the use and maintenance of motor vehicles and the operation and
maintenance of public buildings.68 In most situations in which an
immunity exception applies, there are additional exceptions to the
exception, including one for discretionary acts.69 In cases in which an
exception to districts’ blanket immunity applies, Maine law also imposes
a damage award limit of $400,000 for all claims arising out of a single
occurrence.70
In terms of district employees, Maine law does not provide this sort of
blanket grant of immunity coupled with exceptions. Rather, Maine law
carves out specific areas of immunity, including:
 The performance of discretionary functions;
 Any intentional act or omission within the course and scope of
employment, provided that such immunity does not exist in any
case in which an employee’s actions are found to have been in
bad faith;
 The use of reasonable force by teachers against students who
create a disturbance.71
In cases in which no specific immunity applies to employees, Maine law
provides a back-stop: a personal liability cap of $10,000.72
67. ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 14, § 8103 (2015).
68. Id. § 8104-A.
69. Except for cases involving the operation of a motor vehicle, a governmental entity is not
liable for any claim which results from “[p]erforming or failing to perform a discretionary function
or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused and whether or not any statute, charter, ordinance,
order, resolution[,] or policy under which the discretionary function or duty is performed is valid
or invalid.” Id. § 8104-B.
70. Id. § 8105.
71. Id. § 8111.
72. Id. § 8104-D.
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Maine’s use of discretionary immunity reflects a common approach to
limiting liability of districts and district employees. While states’
definitions of discretionary immunity vary, Maine’s definition, like that
of some other states,73 largely encompasses the supervision of public
school students by teachers and districts. As explained by the Maine
Supreme Court: “An act qualifies as a discretionary function if the act is
essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental
policy program or objective, and ‘requires the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental
employee involved.’”74 Lower courts have applied this definition to
teacher supervision of students.75
In the rare instances where immunity is not available to a district or its
employees, the caps on district and employee liability apply. While the
extent to which districts and employees are immune may be more
important from a jurisprudential perspective, the caps on liability and
damages may be more important from the practical perspective of
plaintiffs. Specifically, when damage caps apply, lawyers may be
reluctant to take a case on a contingency basis. Some research suggests
that the net effect of damage caps is diminished access to the civil justice
system, particularly for low-income plaintiffs.76 In the case of teacher
liability, the effect is obvious: a $10,000 award would not allow for the
recovery of any significant contingency fee for an attorney. While this
may be less of a concern in cases where districts are liable, given the
higher cap that would apply, the legal framework in Maine means that
such cases are few and far between.77
The impact of Maine’s legal framework related to negligent
supervision is illustrated by the dismissal of several cases, including:
 Peterson v. Bangor, in which a kindergartener was injured after
73. E.g., Alaska, Connecticut, and Delaware. The consequences of interpreting discretionary
immunity so as to cover acts related to the supervision of public school students vary by state. In
Maine, districts and their employees are absolutely immune from liability for most discretionary
acts. In contrast, in Connecticut, discretionary immunity applies unless damages result from
wanton, reckless, or malicious conduct.
74. Selby v. Cumberland Cty. et al., 796 A.2d 678, 680 (Me. 2002) (citing Carroll v. City of
Portland, 736 A.2d 279, 282 (Me. 1999)) (internal citations omitted).
75. See Peterson ex rel. Fiandaca v. City of Bangor, 831 A.2d 416, 419 (Me. 2003) (discussing
how the city is not responsible for the teacher’s actions regarding the supervision of students).
76. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between
Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 636–37 (2006)
(discussing the link between damage caps and access to the legal system).
77. Trying to circumvent the cap on employee damages via the assertion of vicarious liability
is unlikely to be successful. See Richards v. Town of Eliot, 780 A.2d 281, 294 (Me. 2001) (quoting
a state statue about vicarious liability not attaching).
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falling off the school playground monkey bars.78
 Lightfoot v. School Administrative District No. 35, in which a
school allowed its wrestling team to use the high school hallways
for timed relay races, leading a student to smash his arm through
a glass window.79
 MS. K ex rel. S.B. v. South Portland, in which a fifteen-year-old
ninth grader with cerebral palsy slipped and fell on a patch of ice
on the sidewalk, suffering severe injuries, leading to multiple
surgeries, including a hip fusion.80
In addition to resulting in the dismissal of such cases, the cap on damages
may result in a number of cases not being filed in Maine courts at all.
III. RETURNING TO CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND DETERRENCE
Overall, the legal frameworks from these four states violate, to varying
degrees, the purposes of the law of tort and negligence as understood by
tort law theory—corrective justice and deterrence. To some extent, this
conflict is apparent: denying a plaintiff the ability to recover damages for
legitimate negligence claims is unjust and removes some of the incentive
for providing high levels of care. This is most clearly evident in the legal
framework in Arkansas, although the frameworks in all four states
establish significant hurdles for plaintiffs harmed as a result of negligent
supervision in schools, hurdles they would not face if they sued private
actors for negligent conduct.
Beyond documenting the extent to which the law in these states makes
recovery for negligent supervision difficult, the research presented in this
Article demonstrates the means through which states accomplish it. Only
the Arkansas framework more or less mirrors the status quo ante of
sovereign immunity that had been roundly decried as unjust by scholars
and judges. The other three states’ legal frameworks undermine the goals
of tort law in more complex and subtle ways, perhaps masking the extent
to which they conflict with the principles of corrective justice and
deterrence. The extent to which these frameworks favor the position of
the state, school districts, and district employees is evident not only in
terms of which side is likely to prevail at trial, but also in terms of how
the civil justice system treats plaintiffs harmed by negligent supervision
overall.
As suggested by the examples of cases from Illinois, Colorado,
Arkansas, and Maine, and others with similar provisions, the civil justice
78. Peterson, supra note 75, at 416.
79. Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 816 A.2d 63, 63 (Me. 2003).
80. MS. K ex rel. S.B. v. City of S. Portland, 407 F. Supp. 2d 290, 290 (D. Me. 2006).
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system often unjustly treats public school students asserting claims on the
basis of negligent supervision. For those plaintiffs whose cases make it
to the courts, the likelihood that a judge will reject their claims is
substantially higher than it would be in a typical negligence case. This
reality raises two issues that interfere with the achievement of the
principles of corrective justice: the denial of recovery for legitimate
claims and the unequal treatment of plaintiffs. If one accepts the validity
of the tort of negligence, denying recovery for legitimate claims is
problematic. What’s more, the fact that different principles apply when
a defendant is a public entity, principles that provide extensive
protections to that defendant, means that plaintiffs suing such defendants
are denied justice in ways that plaintiffs suing private entities are not.
These violations of justice, both the denial of recovery and the unequal
treatment, are magnified when one considers how these legal frameworks
undermine plaintiffs’ pursuit of justice prior to any formal adjudication
of their claims. For example, these frameworks hinder the likelihood of
a plaintiff recovering a favorable pretrial settlement. Defendants have
many incentives to settle a case, but two major incentives are avoiding a
substantial damages award after trial and escaping the large costs
associated with defending a suit. A defendant’s knowledge that he or she
is likely to prevail in a case will inevitably make the defendant less likely
to settle because the risk of an unfavorable outcome is small. Further,
when damage caps and restrictions on punitive damages apply,
defendants know that the harm associated with the worst-case scenario—
losing after a trial—will be limited. Finally, the frameworks that this
Article examines largely hinge on issues of law decided via pretrial
motions and hearings, reducing the likelihood that a claim will go to trial.
Thus, the incentive to settle to avoid large legal bills is also mitigated.
In addition to making the likelihood of an out-of-court settlement low,
these legal frameworks also make it less likely that negligent supervision
claims will ever surface. Because the likelihood of a plaintiff recovering
is so small and the amount of damages plaintiffs may recover is often
capped,81 plaintiffs may find it difficult to even begin the legal process
after an injury in a school, especially if they lack the financial resources
to pay a lawyer rather than rely on representation through contingency.
While such barriers might be less significant in cases involving more
egregious behavior (i.e., behavior that rises to the level of willful and
wanton conduct), damages caps and the lack of punitive damages limit
81. A 2010 study found that twenty-six states have caps applicable to boards, and fifteen states
have caps for employees. Maher et al., supra note 1, at 250–53 tbls. 1, 2. Of the four states that
this Article examines, in addition to Maine, Colorado has a $350,000 cap on damages applicable
to boards and employees. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-114 (West 2015).
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the potential award even if a plaintiff prevails in such a case. Although
only applicable in Colorado, the potential liability for defendants’ legal
costs likely serves as an additional significant disincentive for plaintiffs
and their lawyers contemplating filing a negligence supervision claim.
While the extent to which these frameworks treat plaintiffs unjustly
would be problematic regardless of the legal basis upon which their
claims rest, the denial of recovery for harms related to negligent
supervision arguably raises more concerns from the perspective of
corrective justice than does the denial of recovery for other forms of
negligence. The tort of negligent supervision rests on the notion that
those having physical custody of children are obligated to protect those
children from harm. This obligation is particularly weighty in the context
of mandatory schooling: children and their parents have no choice;
attendance at school is required. By forcing children to attend school, the
state becomes particularly responsible for any harms children experience
there. But these legal frameworks not only prevent the translation of this
heightened responsibility into heightened consequences for failing to
protect children, they also substitute lower consequences than those
facing defendants without such heightened responsibility.
In addition to undermining the goals of corrective justice, the
restrictions on district and district employee liability thwart the
instrumentalist goals associated with deterrence. Although the impact on
the goals associated with deterrence may be less significant than the
impact on the goals of corrective justice,82 the impact on deterrence
nonetheless may be significant. Tort law, including the tort of
negligence, assumes that the possibility of legal liability spurs individual
and institutional actions designed to limit the exposure to that potential
liability. Large damage awards receive media coverage and force
individuals to consider their own vulnerability and the preventative
actions they will take to limit that vulnerability. Likewise, institutions
have the incentive to invest in training, personnel, and equipment
designed to decrease the risk that children will be harmed due to negligent
supervision. The removal or limitation of potential liability removes
one’s incentive to take such action to reduce the risks facing others.
82. My point here is that while corrective justice likely is completely denied when a legitimate
negligence claim is thwarted, a legal framework that limits defendant liability may only weaken
deterrence. One reason is that the possibility of being sued, regardless of whether the actor would
prevail at trial or not, is an incentive to avoid negligent behavior. I am not suggesting that fears of
being sued are the only or even the primary motivator behind districts’ and teachers’ concern for
children’s well-being. Rather, the prospect of litigation and liability is only one of many factors
educators may consider when properly caring for children in their custody. Other possible sources
of this concern include compassion, job security, and public/community relations. The existence
of these other incentives may weaken the impact that limiting liability has on the goal of deterrence.

10_BUCKLEY (1015-39).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

Barriers to Justice, Limits to Deterrence

1037

IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The extent to which the laws in Illinois, Colorado, Arkansas, and
Maine shield public school administrators and teachers from liability for
negligent supervision suggests that neither the values of corrective justice
nor the goals of deterrence are served by the frameworks that this Article
presents. Rules that prevent plaintiffs from being made whole after an
injury fall short of achieving the goals of corrective justice. The unjust
nature of this denial of recovery is amplified by the fact that these
frameworks deny recovery to only some plaintiffs, those harmed by the
negligence of state actors, as opposed to private actors. Finally, if society
accepts the notion that one goal of negligence law is the deterrence of
behavior that exposes others to unreasonable risks, these frameworks fail
from that perspective as well.
Given the extent to which the legal frameworks in Illinois, Colorado,
Arkansas, and Maine conflict with the goals of corrective justice and
deterrence, what changes should be made to these frameworks and the
frameworks of other states that also conflict with these goals? Of course,
there are policy justifications for restricting district and district employee
liability for negligent supervision. For example, subjecting public
employees to liability might discourage some from pursuing public
employment; encourage public officials to make decisions pursuant to
public policy goals, not merely to avoid litigation; and cause high
damages awards and legal costs to drain important resources from the
public purse, resources that otherwise support instruction. But it is
important to consider the costs of such restrictions as well.
What, then, should be done? From the perspective of tort law theory,
the law should strike a better balance between the potential costs of
liability and the potential costs of immunity. Tort law theory provides
some guidance for how these frameworks should be altered to strike such
a balance, but society could take the first step toward this equilibrium by
treating districts and their employees the same way that private actors are
treated under state law. If one accepts the position the Illinois Supreme
Court articulated in 1959—that “school district tort immunity is unjust,
unsupported by any valid reason, and has no rightful place in modern day
society”83—that answer makes sense. Making this change need not
prevent the state from pursuing the goals reflected in restricting district
and district employee liability. Other public policies, informed by tort
law theory, would support these goals without undermining the goals of
corrective justice and deterrence.
For example, if immunity is discarded, state indemnification could
83. Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill. 1959).
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achieve the goal of protecting public employees. But complete
indemnification arguably conflicts with the goal of deterrence: if the
potential for personal liability has a positive effect on behavior (i.e., leads
an actor to be more careful), complete indemnification for individuals
blunts that deterrent effect. Likewise, retaining some degree of direct
personal liability on employees is necessary to achieve the aspect of
corrective justice that compels tortfeasors to make plaintiffs whole. To
address these concerns, state legislatures could revise indemnification
policies to allow for some degree of exposure to liability for negligent
conduct by administrators and teachers. This could be achieved by
making indemnification contingent upon the payment of co-pays or
deductibles common in insurance. For example, indemnification could
cover 80 percent of a damage award with the negligent actor responsible
for the remaining twenty percent.
Narrowly defined discretionary immunity for those charged with
policy making should meet the goal of promoting sound policy judgment
over fears of liability. But the state should only extend immunity to those
state actors that the state actually charges with setting policy, not any state
actor charged with implementing policy on a day-to-day basis. Though
drawing the “immunity line” in terms of administrators who both set and
implement policy would remain difficult, laws could be revised to
encourage courts to interpret “policy setting” narrowly.
Most
importantly, the direct supervision of public school students, typically by
teachers, should be placed explicitly outside of the scope of discretionary
immunity.
One concern motivating immunity for negligent conduct by state
actors is protecting the public purse. But insurance for liability and legal
costs is available to somewhat address this concern, at least from the
perspective of individual districts.84 While some states provide a waiver
of immunity when districts acquire applicable insurance, many of these
states do not require districts to purchase insurance. But mandating that
districts purchase insurance would address this shortcoming by, in effect,
waiving immunity. School districts could be allowed to negotiate with
insurers jointly to keep costs low. But as with indemnification for
employees, if districts and employees are covered by insurance for
damages that arise pursuant to negligent conduct, tort law theory supports
exposing those state actors to some level of direct liability via co-pays or
84. From the perspective of the state, insurance does not completely address the concern with
protecting the public purse. The amount of premiums paid by districts still amounts to a drain on
the amount of aggregate public money spent on education. But from the perspective of districts,
insurance prevents the sort of big financial hit that could result from a finding of liability for
negligent supervision.
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deductibles.
Damages caps present another route to protecting the public purse. But
any cap on damages undermines the values of corrective justice and
deterrence; therefore, such caps should be limited. In theory, if a plaintiff
receives an award that is less than he or she would otherwise receive,
fairness and justice are undermined; if caps on liability exposure reduce
the incentive to be more careful and better protect public school students,
deterrence is also undermined. But if caps are retained as part of the
framework governing negligent supervision, tort law theory and the
workings of the American civil justice system support formulating those
caps with an eye toward incentivizing contingency-based representation
for plaintiffs. In addition, punitive damages, even if capped, should be
available in cases involving egregious behavior.
While not ideal for either plaintiffs or defendants, these sorts of
policies would strike a better balance between the values of corrective
justice and deterrence and the goals reflected in restrictions on liability
for districts and their employees. While the political climate in many
states may not support any increase in public exposure to liability, a
realistic assessment of the extent to which school districts and their
employees currently are shielded from liability might temper the
resistance to such changes.

